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Introduction
One of the more dramatic international legal developments of the last
generation has been the transition of the legal systems of most Latin American
countries from the inquisitorial model to the accusatorial model for the
preparation and trial of both civil and criminal cases.2 A trial in Latin America
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Argentina adopted the accusatorial system for federal criminal procedure in 1989; Peru
followed with codifications in both 1991 and 1994; In 1992, Guatemala became the first
country in Central America to completely reform its Criminal Procedure Code, to become
effective in 1994.; El Salvador and Venezuela introduced party system codes in 1998;
Chile’s reform process began in 1997 and concluded in 2005; Costa Rica’s spanned from
1996-1998; Bolivia and Paraguay were both in 1999; Ecuador was in 2000; Honduras
was in 2002. As of 1998, 19 Latin American countries were moving from the
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conducted under a loose interpretation of the inquisitorial or European model has
traditionally been a closed, drawn-out, written-only process culminating in the
reading of long affidavits made by parties, victims and witnesses, certifications of
various police and other official records and a decision by the judge based upon
the written record and whatever outside influences or biases may have been
brought to bear on the case. For the parties to give live testimony was an
infrequent occurrence which, when it happened, would then be almost totally
controlled by the judge. The investigation and preparatory stage was equally
dominated by the judge.3 The role of the lawyers for the parties at trial was
confined almost exclusively to legal argumentation, usually with no right to crossexamine or present witnesses and often without even access to the relevant
documents.4
The conversion to the accusatorial or so-called American party model has
been driven by reform projects in a large number of countries, accompanied by
statutory enactments, often of entirely new procedural codes. This statutory
reform establishes the new procedural infrastructure to which the Latin lawyer
must now adapt. Whether or not that new framework is changing the prevailing
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legal culture underlying the procedures is problematic. One thing is sure: yet to
be accomplished is the daunting task of training those lawyers to develop the
necessary expertise in practice skills to implement the reforms.
The focus of the article is on Latin America, first, because the author’s
experience is centered in those countries, but also because the wholesale
abandonment of the inquisitorial model in most of the countries of Central and
South America represents a seismic shift in the international legal landscape
which will have implications far beyond statutory reform.
The purpose of this article is to review some of the major differences, both
theoretically and in practice, between the two models and then to examine the
reactions of Latin American litigators to some of the major procedural differences
at trial. The context for the observations is a series of projects in which the
author participated spanning a decade whose objective was to teach attorneys
steeped in the inquisitorial to transition to the accusatorial. During the course of
the projects, the participants found that the procedural differences are
substantial. Certain of those differences gave the participants reason to pause
and question the efficacy and suitability of some of the accusatorial trial
procedures which American litigators have long accepted as orthodoxy. This
article will review only those new trial components which caused the Latin
lawyers the greatest degree of upset. The challenge to the existing trial culture,
as they understood it, combined with the sometimes difficult learning curve of the
various American-model trial competencies, induced reluctance if not outright
rejection of aspects of the accusatorial model.
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The first part of this article will review the author’s experience in teaching
trial competencies to Latin lawyers through this series of both short and long term
transition projects. The second part will describe in very basic fashion the
fundamental differences in the two models, so as to highlight the reasons for the
difficulties encountered in teaching oral practice or oralidad.5 The third part will
review those trial skills that were greeted by the Latin lawyers with reluctance,
suspicion or outright criticism. Finally, though it is very much too early to assess
the success of the transition, several ideas for the future are offered to ease the
process of change.
Background
For fifteen years, it has been the author’s privilege to train lawyers and
judges from various parts of the world in a wide variety of lawyering skills.6
Lawyers and judges from Poland, Ukraine, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt,
Macao, Palestine, Palestine, Spain, Italy and, in particular, much of Central and
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South America have participated with the author in projects designed to compare
law or train non-American lawyers in various trial competencies. Each program
is custom-built, depending on the competency training sought or the focus of the
grant under which the training was conducted. Substantive law programs have
run the gamut from teaching the various international instruments relevant to
practice, to doctrinal areas such as U.S. juvenile law, criminal law and procedure,
the rules of evidence and, in the case of the Palestinian judges program, a
judicial code of ethics. In addition, the author has escorted seven groups of law
students to the Mexican state of Chiapas to work in local human rights legal
offices, primarily on issues affecting the indigenous population.7
The emphasis here is on the teaching of trial advocacy, in particular, to
lawyers from Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and
Venezuela. In discussion with colleagues from other countries, particularly those
European countries that are also in the process of transition, such as Italy, it is
clear that the concerns of the Latin lawyers were very similar to those of the
Europeans, with cross-examination, plea-bargaining, and the jury system
provoking the greatest suspicion of the model.
Many similar projects involving various government, non-government and
international organizations and agencies have included private sector lawyers for
programs ranging from judicial reform to court management to training skills
programs. Under rubrics such as Human Rights, Rule of Law, or Sustainable
7
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Democracy development, these initiatives, and the oralidad training in particular,
have been undertaken by the United Nations8 and the World Bank,9 as well as
American entities such as the State Department, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice,10 and others.11
USAID, as the largest funder of judicial, general legal, and criminal justice
projects world-wide, plays a diverse role internationally.12 While it may, in one
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locale, serve as the on-the-ground face of U.S. foreign policy, it may, in another
location, seemingly independently to improve a variety of domestic systems, from
the sewers and water filtration to the law schools and the legal system. In the
case of Latin America, it seems clear that the principal impetus for the various
U.S. government programs in the Rule of Law area, is to develop a stable,
predictable and overhauled legal system in target Latin countries. USAID policy
statements trumpet the importance of strengthening democratic institutions so as
to better the human rights situation in the country. While it is acknowledged by
all that many Latin legal systems have in the past been used to consolidate
executive power and that impunity among the police and in the judiciary was
endemic,13 it must also be acknowledged that U.S. foreign policy, hopes that
these structural improvements such as oralidad will encourage U.S. and
multinational companies to see the particular environment as safe and
predictablefor business in a developing “free trade” era.14
Promotion of the “rule of law” is a key element in the process of “state
reform.” Not only does law reform respond to demands of the populace but,
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perhaps more importantly to U.S. actors, it facilitates “market rule.”15 As USAID
puts it, “[c]ountries with more effective and equitable justice systems provide
more stable and attractive environments for investment as they provide legal
protections for investors. Increased investment invigorates local economies,
promotes economic growth and creates a favorable environment for U.S.
interests.”16
By the same token, that “democratization” or, better put, that
reconfiguration of the courts to mirror U.S. practice, will, concomitantly, help the
Latin lawyers to become better litigators in their own right and to do battle in their
own courts on an even footing with all parties to that end. It is noteworthy that, in
many cases, there has been a certain due process demand from within the
country to accompany the pressure from the United States. Unfortunately, that
internal pressure usually does not come from the power elite which is best
situated to effect change and should realize that an improved legal system is in
their interests as well.17
For lawyers who had never seen themselves as having any real control
over the presentation and development of the investigation and trial, this change
represents a true revolution in the potential for all lawyers to serve their own
communities as legal advocates rather than, as has always been the case, to
simply bow to the authorized stake-holders and weakly add collateral pieces of
15
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argument or evidence which the court may or may not even acknowledge or take
into consideration.
The author’s role was in the development of trial skills among the lawyers
of the various Latin countries. Though the transition to oralidad posed the
greatest challenge, the transfer of power from the judge to the lawyers in the
presentation of the case requires a very substantial retooling for judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers and civil litigants. The author’s personal motivation
was to help see that those lawyers who previously had little access to the key
decisions of the trial system could now litigate as lawyers trained to do battle in
ways previously unknown–lawyers in control of the case, with the ability to
conduct competent witness examinations, with the imagination to present a
variety of forms of evidence, to make legal arguments based upon the facts as
developed right there in the courtroom, with the ability to object to unreliable or
inadmissible evidence, and unafraid to exercise the right to disagree with the trial
judge.
These changes will eventually not only change the lives of their clients but will
also change the entire legal culture of the country.
Most of the projects described focused on oralidad. The projects in which
the author was involved were funded by a variety of sources, including U.S.
Government agencies.18 Project length would vary from one week to three
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completely uninhibited. This is not to imply that one didn’t notice, from time to
time, that a lawyer participant might defer or hesitate to confront a judge
participant from the same country19 and that, as a result, the dynamic might not
have been quite as robust as it might have been, but that is not a restraint placed
upon the groups by the funders.
The Inquisitorial Model
The European and American trial systems are the products of two very
different procedural cultures. The European system, itself experiencing major
reform initiatives,20 has traditionally reduced the trial phase to mere formalisms
dominated rather completely by the trial judge. In the investigatory phase, the
judge of the investigation (the juge d’instruction in the French system, often cited
as the quintessential example of an unreformed European model) is normally in
charge of the investigation and collection of the evidence, with the goal of

19

Most groups were composed either of lawyers or judges but, in at least one case,
the participants were mixed. Most of the lawyer groups were composed, in the criminal
context, more of public defenders than prosecutors. Civil lawyers tend, in Latin America,
to have a very general practice.
20

See Linarelli and Herzog, Model Practices in Judicial Reform: A Report on
Experiences Outside the Region, Justice Beyond our Borders, (Biebesheimer and Mejia,
eds.) Johns Hopkins Press, 2000; See also David M. Siegel, Training the Hybrid Lawyer
and Implementing the Hybrid System: Two Tasks for Italian Legal Education, 33
Syracuse J. Int’l. L.and Com. 101 (2006); See also U.S. AID reports, Achievements in
Building and Maintaining the Rule of Law: MSI’s Studies in LAC, E&E, AFR, and ANE
Nov. 2002.Occasional Papers Series. Office of Democracy and Governance. Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assoictance.
Http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacr220
.pdf. It should also be noted that the Austrian-German oral preliminary hearing reforms
have served as a model, at least, to the Spanish in the reform of their civil code. Some
commentators feels that the Austrian-German model may be of greater utility than
emulation of the U.S. model. See Fisher and Field III, note 5, p. 51.

11

determining if a crime was committed and, if so, by whom.21 The judge is, in fact,
expected to thoroughly pursue the investigation to its evidentiary conclusion
before the case is turned over either to the public prosecutor or another judge to
enter the trial phase. The investigative judge does so in closed proceedings,
and without the benefit of counsel representing the parties. If there is live
testimony by a witness, it is usually before a clerk who writes the testimony down
in the form of a statement and later presents it to the judge, without any crossexamination, along with the entirety of the investigative file.22 The proceedings
are characterized as “nonadversarial” because each of the participants in this
phase is independent, whether they be appointed rapporteurs or judges.23
Because of the judge’s dominant role in the development of the case and
the importance of the investigatory judge’s findings, the trial phase in the Latin
inquisitorial model became merely a confirmation of the findings of the
investigation and, therefore, the principle of orality was of little utility.24 Should
21
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actual testimony be taken, it is normally the judge who would call the witness and
conduct the examination whereas, in the adversarial system, any such active
questioning by a judge is viewed as a challenge to the party attorneys and is
looked at askance by courts of appeal.
The criminal prosecutor, in the inquisitorial system, often is seen as an
“official” of the state or the executive branch whose role is not to get a conviction
but rather to seek the truth and to make conclusions independently from the
judge.25 The prosecutor usually makes his/her initial appearance on the scene
much earlier than any defense lawyer. As a result, the criminal defense lawyer
and the client are seldom full participants in the process. They arrive late to the
proceedings and their right to confront and present evidence exists only insofar
as the judge chooses to allow it. Even under the new party model, many Latin
American countries have opted to give the prosecution (ministerio publico)
control of the investigation phase (instead of the judge), leaving defense counsel
to protest at the door or exercise extraordinary initiative to embark on a defense
investigation.26
25
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principal structural components of the legal system into the national Constitution.
Most Latin countries also separate powers into equal parts among the executive,
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which renders many of the Constitutional guarantees meaningless.
The other two branches clearly treat the judiciary as a poor relation when
financial resources are allocated. Because funding for the judiciary usually
depends upon the executive or the legislature and because appointment to the
bench is often used as a political reward, the judiciary is usually the most
compromised of the three branches, leading to a highly partisan administration of
justice29 where political manipulation and administrative and budgetary neglect
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are endemic.30 Even when the supreme court of a country has been allocated
substantial public funds, it is often the case that those resources stay within the
supreme court to the detriment of the trial courts, the courts of primera instancia,
where the funds are desperately needed to effect real reform, particularly in the
minimal salaries paid to the lower court judges.31 As in most systems, therefore,
the gap between Constitutional theory and practice is substantial.32
Most of the Latin American legal systems are also code-based, with case
precedent either non-existent or playing a distinctly collateral role in the
process.33 That tradition is firmly entrenched and is not expected to change
under the party model. This reality, of necessity, requires that new codes be
thorough, comprehensive and extremely well-drafted so as to include or at least
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contemplate every conceivable procedural problem. Otherwise, there is little
hope of uniform application of laws or procedure, even within national
boundaries. In those countries with a large indigenous population,34 “customary”
law will often conflict with national legislation, leading to a number of codifications
of indigenous law.
The inquisitorial model as adapted to the various Latin systems has
retained the fundamental European characteristics but with a number of culturally
or politically-dictated modifications in each Latin-American national system. Most
importantly to the subject here, the process, before the transitions which are the
subject of this article, was shrouded in secrecy and was almost completely in
writing.35 The judge’s investigative work, produced in what was called a sumario,
often took years while a criminal defendant waited in jail or the civil parties went
uncompensated. Just as there is little judicial oversight of the police, there has
been traditionally even less oversight of the work of the judiciary.36 In Mexico, for
example, it is common for the judge’s secretary to oversee case investigation
and development, including the statement of the defendant, while judges
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themselves seldom appear.37 In Chile, the judges lacked investigative capacity
and often delegated major functions to the police and clerks whom they then
failed to supervise.38 The role of counsel, even where the codes stipulate that
counsel should be appointed, is minimal until well into the investigation phase
and normally not until the defendant, in the criminal case, has at least made a
statement.39
Because is undeniable that the judge, not the litigants, has been in charge
during the preliminary and the trial stage,40 and because the attorneys for the
parties took no active role other than, perhaps, written pleadings,41 there has
traditionally been the widespread perception of judicial arbitrariness, insulation of
the judicial elite, and a “stultifying formalism” that “throws the facts of life out of
court.”42 The desire for legitimacy and a true sense of due process has fueled,
from within the countries themselves, many of these changes toward the party
37
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system. Because the old system is so deeply embedded in legal tradition, it is
easy to see how positively revolutionary it is to turn the tables and put the
litigants (the adversaries) in charge. The litigants, under the reform codes,
investigate and develop the case, choose the evidence and the witnesses they
wish to present, the order in which they wish to present them, cross-examining
the opponents’s evidence and then arguing from a distinctly partisan point of
view about a result that, for once, has not yet been de facto decided. For the first
time in Latin American legal history, there are two conflicting sides to each legal
dispute that makes it to trial.
The Lawyers and Judges in the Training Programs
The body of practical experience from which this article is drawn consists
of over fifteen groups of lawyers and judges from Latin America whose
participation in these projects was focused on learning the basics of trial
advocacy skills. The first group consisted of 14 “human rights” lawyers, mostly
from El Salvador, who spent three months in Chicago trying to learn the party
system. The “human rights” theme of the group was aspirational. Most of the
lawyers in that group were academics with a practice on the side, along with
several public defenders. That project was followed by seven programs for
Guatemalan lawyers who, over the next three years, came to DePaul University
College of Law for shorter but more intense training. These groups consisted
mainly of sitting judges,43 public defenders, prosecutors and a few academics.
43

For an overview of the USAID judicial training programs in Latin America, see
Linn Hammergren, Judicial Training and Justice Reform, USAID, Rule of Law Series,
Pub. No. PN-ACD-021 (Washington, 1998).

18

The last group brought to Chicago specifically for trial skills training was part of
what was called an Inter-American Clinic, funded by the international Labor
Organization, to help community-based human rights lawyers to litigate, partyfashion, in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica. These 21
lawyers were from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Chiapas, Mexico.
The principal distinguishing feature of this group is that each came to the
program equipped with an actual case file to litigate, looking to the project to
teach them how to best advance that litigation. The Project Directors having
reviewed the files to determine the viability of the cases,44 the lawyers now
looked to the project to teach them how to litigate.45
Subsequent trainings were conducted in the home country, either by
design or because, after the events of September 11, the participant visa issue
became too onerous and it was determined that the several remaining programs
should be conducted abroad. One week or longer training sessions were held in
Venezuela, for judges and public defenders, Guatemala, for professors and
lawyers on the rules of evidence, Costa Rica, for attorneys planning to litigate in
44

Project staff included two attorneys who had served as staff attorneys at the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights for a combine total of over ten years.
45

Presentation of cases before Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Right is largely handled by the Center for Justice
and International Law (CEJIL), a non-governmental organization of lawyers specializing
in practice before the Inter-American Court and the Commission. CEJIL’s advocacy is
often disconnected from the client community from which the particular case emanates.
An interesting corollary effect of this Depaul Inter-American clinic is that the lawyers are
expected to return to their localities and to train their colleagues in oralidad, producing
the so-called multiplier effect of the project. For further information on the CEJIL
caseload, see http://www.cejil.org.
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the Inter-American Court for Human Rights, and Chiapas, Mexico for human
rights lawyers.46
Methodology
The project objective started from the premise that countries in transition
from the inquisitorial to the accusatorial model could learn from the structure and
operation of the accusatory American trial. The key structural components of the
American trial had been codified in most of the Latin reform projects, with the
exception of the jury system. In no way, however, was homogeneity the goal of
the programs, particularly given the diversity of the Latin American legal systems.
The author approached the task with some misgivings since it is easier to admire
the structure of the American system rather than its actual operation. One
concern was that the programs would teach skills unique to the American way of
trying cases but not suitable for adaptation. It was also of concern that the major
weaknesses, some would say the essential dysfunction of the trial system (or at
least the jury trial system) here would be patently obvious and lead to a
wholesale rejection of what is nonetheless probably a theoretically or
conceptually more desirable method– the party method. Finally, it was also clear
that certain components of the European model that had become co-extensive
with Latin American tradition ultimately would be preserved, regardless of the
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During this same time period, non-Latin American projects conducted by the
author included programs in San Sebastian, Spain at the Institute of Criminology, Pau,
France at the law school, Genoa, Italy at the law school, and two in Palestine, the first at
two Palestinian law schools and later with the entire Palestinian judiciary, with sessions
in both Ramallah and in Gaza.
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mandates of the reform legislation.47 To recognize and accept those traditions,
whether or not they made sense in the American system or even if their purpose
in the national system (as described by the students) was unclear, would also be
a frequent challenge.
Resolved never to defend the indefensible and committed to helping Latin
lawyers make this important transition with a sensitivity to their local custom and
practice, the task at hand was made easier by our frequent acknowledgment of
the pertinent weaknesses of American practice and its irrelevance to many of the
local issues faced by participating lawyers. Admitting the frailty of the notion of
justice in general, that judges and juries everywhere can be biased, that there is
sometimes a great distance between theory and practice and then sharing with
the students a trial lawyer’s natural cynicism about real rather than formalistic
due process was actually a bonding experience that enabled instructor and
student to communicate more frankly and directly.
Communicating effectively with the non English-speaking trial lawyers was
a predictable issue. In the author’s experience, as a long-time francophone and
recent convert to Spanish, language proficiency is not a major barrier in Latin
America, France, Spain, or the countries of North Africa. In other countries,
consecutive translation was always available. Even with everyday fluency, a
legal vocabulary is a separate form of discourse requiring additional preparation.
With the Latin projects, it soon became easier to say, for example, “judgement
notwithstanding the verdict” than it was sometimes to describe the mundane or
47

Field and Fisher, supra, note 5, p. 49.
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every day. In any event, native or more fluent speakers were easily available for
translation.
Another challenge was the manner in which the classes were to be
conducted. Most of the skills training models in American law schools are
unknown to Latin American lawyers. Legal education in Latin America, for the
most part, consists of very large classes delivered in the lecture format.48
Seldom is there an opportunity for any student participation, much less any
dialogue, Socratic or otherwise, between teacher and student. Only recently
have legal clinics begun to appear in Latin countries but, even then, the focus is
seldom on litigation skills but rather on general client advocacy through letter
writing, some investigation, accompaniment, etc. This situation is complicated
by the fact that, in Latin law schools, there is very little emphasis on the needs of
practice or procedural rules and virtually no instruction on oralidad.49 Most law
students in Latin America are offered only very theoretical or historical courses
which emphasize jurisprudential development to the detriment of application.50
Nor are
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The University of Buenos Aires offers a typical example. It is a public
institution with a policy of open access, with no entrance requirements or national
graduation standards. The student body numbers over 30,000 students. Dakolias, supra,
note 2. For a broad discussion of the state of legal education in Latin America, see
generally Alfredo Fuentes-Hernandez, Globalization and Legal Education in Latin
American: Issues for Law and Development in the 21st Century, 21 Penn St. Int’l. L.Rev.
39 (2002).
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See Hendrix, Steven E., Restructuring Legal Education in Guatemala: A model
for law School Reform in Latin America, Journal of Legal Education, Vol 54, Dec. 2004.
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there many practice-oriented specialty courses such as trial advocacy. In fact,
the Latin American lawyer never attended law school as Americans know it.
What is called law school is merely a “major” (sometimes a major that excludes
all other disciplines) that one chooses for the undergraduate years. There is no
post-graduate requirement. Most law school professors are part-time due to the
low salaries.51
The standard method for teaching trial advocacy in American law schools
is in a separate course or set of courses conducted on the simulation/critique
method.52 It was explained to the foreign attorneys that there would be very little
lecture and that our basic routine would be to have the students prepare
arguments and examinations outside of class and then present in class the
assigned trial exercises. After the presentation, there would be a critique and,
time permitting, some discussion. The discussions would often center on a
subject completely unfamiliar to them, for example, the notion of a theory of the
case and how to weave it into the examination. In the selection of trial exercises,
there was an emphasis placed on opening and closing statements, direct, cross
and redirect examination. There was less of an emphasis on motions practice or
other legal argument on the theory that those advocacy skills would be more
51

For a general discussion of the traditional mode of Latin legal education, see
Joseph R. Thome, Heading South but Looking North: Globalization and Law Reform in
Latin America, 2000 Wis.L.Rev. 691. See also Dakolias, A Strategy for Judicial Reform:
The Experience in Latin America, 36 Virginia Journal of International Law 167 (Fall,
1995)
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For an early seminal work on the simulation method, see Michael Meltsner and
Philip G. Schrag, Towards Simulation in Legal Education: An Experimental Course in
Pre-Trial Litigation (1975). See also Thomas F. Geraghty, Foreword: Teaching Trial
Advocacy in the 90s and Beyond, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 687 (1991).
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familiar to the participating students, most of whom had made some amount of
legal argumentation in their local courts. A key part of the presentation was
always a demonstration of how the particular exercise should ideally be done,
emphasizing, of course, that there could be several different but nonetheless
valid approaches to the same exercise. The demonstration could, depending on
the skill level of the group, be done before or after the student exercises on the
particular trial skill in question. Finding law students who spoke Spanish fluently
enough to perform an opening or closing argument or a witness examination
scripted by the author or to act as witnesses was not difficult.53 The instructor’s
critique usually followed the recommended American pattern: usually no more
than two points which draw specifically from what the student had said, no more
than 3-4 minutes in length before moving on to the next student. Longer
discussions, when necessary, were usually had at the end of all of the student
performances or outside of normal class time.54
Very little time was spent studying the recent recodification of trial
procedure in the various countries. That inquiry was left to the individuals, many
of whom had already gone through training programs on the substance and
some of the implications of the new procedures. Many had come to understand

53

In other countries, such as Italy or Palestine, the author performed the
demonstration which was then translated consecutively, sentence by sentence.
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This teaching methodology is drawn principally from the “learn-by-doing”
method initiated and fostered by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy. See Teachers’
Manual for Problems and Cases in Criminal Trial Advocacy, National Institute for Trial
Advocacy (2nd Ed. 1989).
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the daunting nature of learning the fundamentals of the party system. 55 Because
they were accustomed only to “trial by affidavit,” they understood and accepted
that oralidad training would be the principal objective of the program.56
The decision was made to maximize the time each student spent in actual
oral advocacy. Where possible, the students were sent at least one and
normally three simulated case files fully translated into Spanish,57 complete with
photos of real evidence, simulated police or accident reports, reports of experts,
pretrial statements, depositions, and other essentials one would find in the
standard case files used in the trial advocacy course.58 Ideally, these materials
would be received weeks or even months before the course began. In some
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In Guatemala, for example, the enactment, in July, 1994, of the Criminal
Procedures Code required sweeping changes in the key legal sector institutions: the court
system (Organismo Judicial), the Prosecutors Office and the Public Defenders Office.
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It should also be noted that considerably less time was spent on hearing
procedures in civil cases. On one hand, criminal systems have been the priority of most
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cases, advance distribution was simply impossible. Also distributed in advance
was an overview of the basic trial schematic explaining the order of the
presentation of the opposing cases. In some cases, translated descriptive
summaries giving an overview of the trial system, a description of the basic
evidentiary objections, and a listing of possible pretrial motions were also handed
out.
The instructor’s preparation, in addition to a thorough understanding of the
case files assigned and adequate training in the critique method,59 included a
review of the recent codifications of the participating countries. That might
include a new code of criminal procedure or legislation mandating a transition to
the party system or modifications of the traditional system. The task is easier
when one is seeking only to highlight differences in procedure. Since most Latin
American countries are “code” countries and case precedent plays much less a
role than in this country, there was seldom any case law to review.
The course’s first session was usually devoted to an explanation of the
trial phase and an abbreviated look at U.S. pretrial civil or criminal procedure.
Those overviews were presented in a discussion format to draw out the
differences and clarify several of the U.S. idiosyncracies, sometimes with
computer graphics or handouts to help students visualize the problems. Each
lawyer was then assigned to a party in one of the cases, instructed to review the
entire file, and to be prepared to present whatever exercise was scheduled for
59

The author, a former trial lawyer, had served for many years as the Director of
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programs sponsored, inter alia, by the National Institute of Trial Advocacy.
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the next class. Once assigned to a particular party, the student would advocate
that party’s interest for all of the exercises. Should there be time in the program
to repeat the exercises, students would then be assigned to represent a different
party in a different case. It was recommended that the participants work in small
groups to better understand the file and to develop a theory of the case. It was
also recommended that the students conduct small group oral “rehearsals” of the
exercises. That particular recommendation was less likely to be followed unless
student program assistants actually scheduled practice sessions.
At each class session, a prosecutor and defender or plaintiff and
defendant from each of the “teams” assigned to a particular case would be
designated to begin a series of repetitions of the assignment for each of the
several case studies. One student in the group would perform, “opposing
counsel” would be making objections and waiting to do the cross-examination or
the responsive argument and other group members would observe, role-play the
witness, or sit as the judge. The judge role-play was more valuable than the
witness role-play as it gave the attorneys an opportunity to feel first-hand the
frustration of the judge transitioning to the party model. If resources are
available, outsiders are better suited to act as witnesses, simulating the
equivocation, inconsistency and lack of articulation of a typical trial witness. The
instructor’s role, as it is in law school trial advocacy, was to observe but not to
stop or allow the stopping of the exercise for any reason until ready for the
critique. The students were told that they should attempt to resolve their own
difficulties by staying in role and that conflicts were to be decided by the judge.
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Perhaps surprisingly, very few students had “breakdowns” in the middle of an
exercise.
In the witness examination exercises, the students were to present direct,
cross and redirect even though there is no provision in most Latin American
procedural codes, even the new ones, for redirect. We did not conduct a
simulated rebuttal case for the state or plaintiffs, again departing from actual
practice but following the standard trial advocacy format. As a matter of the
instructor’s preference, two students would perform an exercise representing the
opposing parties before each critique. Though the critique would not occur until
there had been two performances, the critique itself was individualized.
Exercises were limited in time so that each student assigned in a class ranging
from 10-15 people could perform at least once per 2 or 2 1/2 hour class session.
This posed a problem for these experienced lawyers who, if nothing else, were
accustomed to making long speeches and then justifying their action later during
the critique. It was often necessary for the instructor to cut short an examination
or argument that was rambling.
At the conclusion of the course, it would be ideal to conduct an entire
mock trial but time was truly of the essence in all but the first of these programs.
That first program, three months in length, was luxuriously arranged so as to not
only allow for full final mock trials, but also to allow actual visits to civil and
criminal trials and to dialogue with Hispanic judges and lawyers about the trial
system. At the very least, time should be left to conduct an evaluation of the
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program and to give each of the students more personal, detailed feedback than
can be done in the classroom atmosphere.
Nature of the Resistance
The mistakes made by the program lawyers very substantially mirrored
the mistakes that American law students are prone to make. To mention a few at
the outset, it was very infrequent that arguments or witness examinations
reflected a coherent theory of the case; the basic rules of cross-examination
were violated with impunity, with particular note of the participants’ insistence on
asking open-ended questions on cross-examination; not understanding the
importance of constructing a narrative so the trier of fact has the impression of
being told a story (what American lawyers would call a jury-centered approach)
or even the importance of artful presentational or rhetorical skills in general,
many of the students would persist in reading their prepared scripts or using
cross-examination as a fishing expedition where distracting and useless
arguments with the witness were inevitable.
Normally, the judges, whether real or role-playing, showed an overeagerness to speak and interrupt in court. Presumably, that was because they
were accustomed to running the courtroom in their national systems. The
attorney participants, whether prosecutors, defense lawyers or private
practitioners, were often, at the outset, timid and reluctant. One of the many
satisfactions with teaching this type of program is that, with time and practice, the
lawyers relax and begin to find their “voice” in the courtroom. They become more
engaged not only in understanding the orthodox techniques but also in
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developing their own sense of their personality in the courtroom. Opening and
closing arguments were the easiest for the lawyers to simulate because of the
similarity with legal argument.
The participants found it difficult to accept several of the fundamentals of
the American trial system. Though there is no single component of our system
that met with unanimous disapproval, it is possible to segregate out a number of
the aspects of the party trial system that met with the most resistance.
A) The jury system. Of the many unusual reactions, perhaps the most
unanticipated was the almost complete rejection of the jury system.60 The most
common observation made by participants in this regard was that cases must be
tried by “competent” people, trained in the law, and commanding of respect. A
jury chosen at random from the citizenry, the argument went, would simply not
be intelligent or learned enough to resolve complicated factual issues and would,
therefore, operate to denigrate the whole system. The assurance that the jury
would be instructed in the law and that their main job was to decide the contested
facts as highlighted by the lawyers for both sides was of little consolation. Even
lawyers from the most corrupt legal systems, where few judges would dream of
contradicting the police or military authorities, and where one would think a
randomly-selected jury would offer the best chance of an honest, unbiased result,
were quick to condemn leaving so heavy a social responsibility on the shoulders
of the average citizen. The most left-leaning of the lawyers, whom I had
expected to side with the democracy-building tactic of letting the people decide
60

For an example of one of the few codes that has introduced a jury system, see
Law No. 1970, enacted March 25, 1999 in Boliva, to take effect in 2001.
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important issues which affect the social fabric such as criminal conduct , argued
that, ideally, members of the community should sit in judgement of each other but
that the whole notion was contrary to their tradition and culture and that their
countries were not yet ready for the citizen jury.
Given the high rates of illiteracy in so many Latin countries and the
repressive state apparatus that would intimidate many jurors into coming to a
government-desired result, it shouldn’t be completely surprising that even
habitually anti-government lawyers would think they had a better chance with a
judge than with a jury. There was also the perception, not altogether
unreasonable, that, with juries, the premium on charlatanism by the trial lawyers
would increase and performance, rather than the facts or a sense of justice,
would dictate the outcome. They were not surprised to hear of the very low
rates of actual juries in this country.61 Their conclusion from the data was that
American lawyers also shared their distrust of juries. Although that is sometimes
the case, the primary reason for the low rate of juries in this country is the time
and expense burden that juries place on an already over-loaded trial calendar in
this, the most litigious of all countries.62 Though most American trial lawyers
61
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would agree that certain cases, on their facts, should not be tried to a jury, most
would agree that the jury ranks highly on the list of American institutions.
B) The suggestibility of cross-examination. Cross-examination posed
any number of both principled and pragmatic objections. The most common
complaint was that, because leading questions are suggestive, the fairness of the
proceeding is compromised by cross-examination. Lawyers given the normal
latitude on cross were seen as exercising too much control over the witness and
putting words into the witness’ mouth. Indeed, substantial time was spent
instructing students on the phrasing of questions so as to elicit one word
responses as well as the development of the ability to cut off a witness who
wishes to respond beyond the narrow parameters of the closed-ended question
that was asked. It was also recommended, consistent with basic trial teaching
orthodoxy, that the cross-examiner avoid asking any question to which he/she
did not already know the answer and that certain areas of the direct testimony
should just be avoided on cross where there was nothing to gain.63
The notion that the cross-examiner would not review all of the testimony
given on direct or that the lawyer would simply direct the witness’ testimony to a
few areas of weakness was foreign to most of them. As a result, there were
many questions to the effect of “were you sure when you said on direct...” or “is it
possible that you were mistaken when you said....” Given the notion that a
witness on cross-examination should not be allowed to give any extended
answers, and that, in reality, it is the lawyer who is testifying by virtue of the
63
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weave of the questions, and, finally, that the goal is to have the witness merely
confirm what the lawyer is actually stating (albeit in question form), the overall
impression taken away by program participants was often that cross-examination
seemed over-bearing and oppressive. In addition to those observations, many of
the students also felt that witnesses in their countries would not have the temerity
to stand their ground during an aggressive cross-examination and that a lot of
“badgering” objections would be necessary.
C) The parties’ duty to investigate. The American lawyer is
accustomed to accepting the duty to the client to begin the investigation and
preparation of the case from virtually the moment of being retained. The Latin
American project participants often found it difficult to accept that they should do
an investigation independent of the police and prosecutorial authorities (in
particular, the fiscal, or prosecutor, who is almost always a public official). They
were taken aback when told that the party model demanded that each lawyer sift
through the evidence, and then decide which evidence their client should present
and to assess which evidence is likely to be presented by the opponent.
Moreover, the suggestion that the defense (in criminal cases) would take “to the
street” and practically race the prosecution to get statements from the witnesses
was antithetical to their customary notion that the defense is not even activated
until the investigation is complete, an arrest has been made and the prosecution
has made a formal recommendation. Under the old model, the judge (or the
judge’s delegate) supervised the continuing investigation while the parties
watched. Under the new systems, it is not specified in the codes exactly what
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procedures are to be followed and when those procedures are activated but it
seemed the consensus that the duty to investigate transfers from the judge to the
prosecution. In some countries, it seemed clear that the prosecution would
supervise police activity. In others, the prosecution is left to review police
evidence or to conduct a separate investigation. These provisions are unclear or
nonexistent in most of the new codes but the participating attorneys were
confident that the main effect of the transition would be to place investigation
squarely under the jurisdiction of the prosecution in criminal cases.64
The notion of becoming familiar with the opponent’s case if for no other
reason than to be able to conduct a reasonable cross-examination was equally
unfamiliar. If the prosecutor had already interviewed the witnesses and the
police, there was no reason, argued the students, to conduct any separate
defense interviews until the time of trial. The idea that the prosecution or police
would conduct an incomplete or biased investigation was met with a shrugging of
shoulders.
Even the criminal defense lawyers in the groups were reticent to doubt
the credibility of the state’s investigation or to agree that an in-depth challenge to
all state evidence where possible is part of the professional duty. Because all
agreed that the police would do little or nothing to flesh out the defense, the
64
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lawyers were more comfortable with the idea of simply developing a defense
case, independent of the prosecution, and letting the prosecution put its case
together without interference or even participation by the defense. Neither the
criminal nor the civil lawyers could easily accept the analogy between trial
lawyers and architects: that both sides have the same raw materials but each
side would build a different building. The tendency, rather, was to accept the
building as presented by the plaintiff/prosecutor, to avoid attacking the edifice
and merely to construct a defense which relied mainly on saying that the
opposing case lacked credibility.
The acceptance in most Latin countries that the police or government
investigators do the investigating and that the lawyers have no role independent
of those investigations poses serious issues for the future success of the party
model in Latin America. In fact, criminal investigation is one of the most serious
and neglected problems in most underdeveloped systems, with police having no
access to forensic methods, relying primarily on witness statements65 and the
confession.66 The use of sophisticated and expensive investigatory techniques is
just beginning and only in those countries willing to expend resources on the
justice system and law enforcement. In some places, scientific and technical
experts are beginning to be used in the justice system. To the participants,
however, the idea that a lawyer could investigate complicated scientific matters
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and then effectively compete on cross-examination with a doctor, forensic
specialist or other kind of expert was completely unknown to them.
D) The role of the judge. The role of the judge changes most
dramatically in the changeover to the party system. The groups of judges in
these programs found their new roles most unacceptable even though, under the
new system, they retain the ultimate power of final decision at the trial level.
They were very accustomed to being in charge of most aspects of the
proceedings: supervising the investigation, calling whichever witnesses they
wanted, in the order they chose, and then asking all or most of the questions.
For a judge to be “reduced” to the role of referee, merely ruling on objections or
legal points, seen but not heard until there is a problem, was perhaps too
shocking for them to absorb in the few short weeks of the programs. Time and
again, the simulations were derailed by a “judge” (whether in role or really a
judge) who wanted to find out immediately whatever it was he or she wanted to
know and was not willing to let the examinations take their course. In that
situation, the judge would either insist on questioning, arguing with the lawyers,
introducing into evidence items that neither counsel had submitted, or simply
commenting very prematurely on credibility.

It was common, for example, for a

role-playing participant to rule on an objection or motion with commentary to the
effect that he/she simply didn’t believe the testimony. Whenever there was an
objection, particularly a relevancy objection, the judges were likely to assess both
the legal aspects and the credibility of the witness, or just simply offer their own
opinion of what the witness was or was not saying. Since the jury system
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appears to be one of the less feasible transplants to Latin systems, the judge
(and any associate “assessors” or panels of judges as exist in some systems)67
will remain the final determiners of credibility and, as such, will retain the ultimate
decision-making power. Because judges are usually on a separate professional
career track and because they are often the products of judicial-training
institutions,68 it should be workable to convince at least the next generation of the
judiciary that the need in the transition is to adapt to a different but not inferior
role.
One side effect of this problem of hyper-active judges was a high
occurrence of argument among counsel and the bench. Rather than focus on
the jury or on the flow of the case and the importance of telling a story, counsel
very quickly would get engaged in heated debate or “legal” argument that could
easily have been avoided or simply wasn’t worth the disruption. In the author’s
experience, this is also typical of U.S. students.
E) Plea-bargaining. The debate over plea-bargaining was never-ending.
In most pre-transition Latin systems, a trial is eventually held in every case that
isn’t dismissed during the investigation phase . That trial, however, may seem
more like a guilty plea in that the judge will often review the written summarized
evidence, not call any witnesses (the defendant in the criminal case is the most
common witness), and restrict the lawyers to arguing matters pertaining to
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sentencing. A resolution of the matter pre-trial by conference between the
attorneys, with or without the judge, was previously unknown, although there are
now signs of change in a number of national systems that have converted to the
party model.69 Under the old model, there are not two parties between whom
there can be a negotiation and agreement. There is no tradition of compromising
on the charges since the official duty is the discovery of the “truth,” meaning that,
even if the defendant admits guilt, the process goes on through a formal “trial” so
as to properly apply the law to the facts and then to decide the sentence.70
There is no recognition that the defense lawyer is an equal partner to the
proceedings along with the judge and the “official” prosecutor (the fiscal). Even
should there be some sort of agreement between the prosecutor and the
defendant, there is, in the inquisitorial model, no provision that the judge should
even hear of such a compromise much less be bound by it.
The students came quickly to the understanding that, without pleabargaining, the American system would collapse under its own weight. When
they heard that in excess of 90% of all our cases are decided by guilty plea or by
settlement, our avowed dedication to the jury system was diminished in their
eyes.71 Several practical aspects of the guilty plea process struck many
participants as clear violations of human rights. For example, it is common
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practice in the United States that, in exchange for a guilty plea, an indicted
charge will be reduced. In some jurisdictions, depending on the local legal
culture, the prosecutor may even threaten that, if the defendant chooses not to
plead guilty, a new indictment can be sought which would, in fact, increase the
severity of the charges to be faced.72 That sort of a threat was seen as coercive
to many participants and a threat to due process. Another practice that seemed
anathema to them is the procedure sanctioned by the so-called Alford73 plea,
whereby a not-guilty person could nonetheless plead guilty to simply get out of
pretrial incarceration or because the weight of the evidence seemed such that a
trial would be very risky. Many participants argued that the Alford plea is
completely violative of every due process sense they had and renders the right to
trial and the right to jury trial illusory. Finally, the idea that a prosecutor would
over-charge a defendant to have more leeway in plea bargaining was also
generally seen as unethical and anti-defendant.74
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F) Theory and theme of the case. For a number of reasons, the
lawyers exhibited very limited capacity to develop a theory of the case75 and
even less willingness to see that task as key in a trial system focused on a
credible narrative of events. In both argument and witness examination, criminal
defense lawyers, in particular, would project inconsistent or highly speculative
defenses or spend large amounts of time and effort solidifying a key point of the
opponent as a side effect of having pounced on a clearly collateral
inconsistency. The notion that a party must be able to explain their case in a
short two-sentence summation was widely resisted. Though the development of
a theme76 to use in opening statements and closing arguments was more
popular and seen by the participants as perhaps an amusing rhetorical device,
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there was a general conclusion that a theme would not be usable before a
judicial trier of fact in Latin America.
The nature of legal argument in Latin countries is to paint with a broad
brushstroke, not often focusing on key bits of evidence or testimony. The
students, whether judges or simply lawyers, had very little eye for the kind of
minute detail which, when exploited, can decide between guilty and non-guilty,
liability from non-liability. Behind this reluctance, the trained observer would see
the underlying reason for the hesitation: the Latin lawyer refuses to accept that
the outcome of a trial may depend on the quality of the advocacy. Once that
proposition is accepted, the adversarial system will quickly bloom.
G) The Presentation of “Novel” Types of Evidence. Least surprising of
all was the students’ reluctance to see video and computer evidence or other
types of demonstrative tools in the presentation of the case. The threshold issue
is, of course, the resources to assemble these testimonial aids. It was not
difficult for the participants, whether they worked in an under-funded prosecution
or defense office or on their own in a small office, to predict that many years will
pass before the technology of the American courtroom appears in Latin
America.77 Beyond the resources issue, it was feared that some of the newer
types of evidence would deceive the trier of fact and therefore be prejudicial.
There was widespread distrust of computerized evidence, such as accident
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reconstructions,78 With some degree of indignation, one student said that
computers should never be allowed to replace people which, ultimately, is
perhaps the direction of U.S. litigation. The reluctance did not apply to forensic
evidence, maps or charts, photographs or video interviews. Since it appears that
there is very little precedent for using even the most common types of
demonstratives in Latin cases, the discussion often centered on issues of
admissibility and, in general, convincing the judge of the reliability of the
evidence.
One likely explanation for the hesitation to see technology in the
courtroom as an important advance is perhaps the fact that trial lawyers in Latin
America (and elsewhere) have not traditionally had the latitude in the
presentation of evidence that has been enjoyed by American lawyers. Given the
procedural strait-jacket of the inquisitorial model and its restrictions on the role of
the lawyers, Latin American attorneys may feel that they will not be allowed to
present newer forms of evidence, demonstrative or otherwise, in courtrooms
where judges are accustomed to trial by affidavit. All agreed that the party
attorney would need to request permission of the judge to introduce a new form
of evidence, whereas the U.S. trial lawyer can be more confident that an
acceptable foundation of reliability can be laid.
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Future
Fairness to the litigants is what should be at the heart of the changes now
sweeping through Latin American trial systems. In a hitherto closed and
inaccessible process, the real parties in interest are often left with a sense of lack
of due process, a sense that they have not received their “day in court.” Indeed,
they have not received their day in that they had very little control over the
investigation, presentation, or analysis of the case. The change to the party
system lets the litigants (with the assistance of counsel) become a more integral
part of the proceedings. The trial phase should show the most dramatic
transformation, with the counsel for the litigants now in charge of the presentation
of the case, with the broadening of live witness testimony, the confrontation
inherent to cross-examination, and the right to present the evidence, including
evidence in its newer forms, according to the trial plan of the party.
The oral hearing model should also encourage judges to not only be more
efficient but also more open and transparent in how they decide and in how they
manage the proceedings.79 Particularly because most reforms call for public
trials,80 the overall effect should be to offer a new sense of legitimacy to the
justice system, especially since judges would now be publicly accountable for
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their decisions.81 The dynamic of the trial process should also change
dramatically. When there are open hearings where the parties are actually
present and offering testimony, where lawyers and judges are interacting not only
over procedure but also over the evidence, the trial level will seem much more
about real problems involving real people, rather than just a stack of written
materials to be waded through, summarized, and digested.82
American lawyers are comfortable with having counsel develop and
present the evidence favorable to the client and letting the opponent do the
same. We recoil at the notion that the judge would be the primary actor, calling
the witnesses, controlling the presentation of evidence, and commenting on the
strength of the case as the trial unfolds. Particularly in countries where the
neutrality or integrity of the judiciary is suspect, oralidad and the requirement that
the case be decided on the evidence presented by the parties rather than the
evidence reviewed by the judge in some closed proceeding marks a step forward
in inducing judicial accountability for decisions. Forced to make decisions based
upon a record that was available for all to see in a public trial will render the legal
system more accessible and democratic.
The transition will also improve the quality of the trial bar and strengthen
the ability of lawyers to be truly effective advocates. The ability to investigate
and have access to the evidence will encourage a much more proactive style of
lawyering, empowering attorneys to get fully involved in the case at a much
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earlier stage and to therefore reliably predict to their clients what the evidence
will be at trial, how it will be presented, and what the prospects are for success.
It will also help lawyers to develop the eye for detail and contradiction that is not
taught in Latin American law schools and cannot be developed without an
opportunity to truly challenge the evidence.
Oralidad will create a whole new subclass of attorneys known for their
courtroom brilliance, their ability to creatively present a case and to attack the
case against them. More importantly, any lawyer trained in the party system
should eventually feel that the interest of the client, rich or poor, powerful or
powerless, can be leveraged onto an even playing field where the primary focus
of the case, by virtue of the attorney’s ability to examine, cross-examine, and
argue, will be on the rights of all the parties, not just those favored by the judge.
One can only hope that once the reins of management of the case are
loosened from the grip of the trial judge, that the opposing parties, in the spirit of
civil but hard-fought combat, will take the proceedings much more into the realm
of ordinary discourse and trials will become more accessible to the
understanding of the non-lawyer. Judges, remaining the ultimate decisionmakers, should not see their management roles as diminished but rather
redirected. The demystification of the trial process should be an integral
component in maximizing the impetus to reform the trial system.
Rules of Evidence and Discovery
Another purpose of this article is to anticipate some of the problems that
will be brought on by the change in trial systems. Those changes will engender a
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new set of problems about which trial lawyers will soon be making demands for
change.83 One of those problem areas concerns rules of evidence. The author
has participated in two projects to develop rules of evidence and discovery, it
having become obvious that trial procedures alone were not sufficient to
complete the transition. The need for rules of evidence should be clear. There
are quite simply no well-accepted rules that govern the admissibility of evidence,
including even the most generally agreed-upon concepts of relevance. For
example, the trial lawyers and the judges in the programs, whether real or inrole, would quickly seek to introduce the criminal defendant’s character or past
encounters with the law, regardless of when they occurred, their seriousness,
whether they resulted in a conviction, or whether the defendant had testified or
would testify.84 For another, hearsay was occasionally objected to but on a
relevance basis. It was surprising to learn that the Spanish word for hearsay85 is
not commonly used in Latin courts and that there is no general rule for
admissibility of hearsay, much less for exceptions. As a third example, judges
will commonly dismiss witnesses as incompetent on any number and variety of
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grounds such as children under sixteen, persons with disabilities such as
blindness, all extended family relatives, and the like.86
The lack of codification or uniformity of practice in Latin America is
understandable, given that many of the federal and state rules of evidence in the
U.S. are predicated on a need to protect juries from prejudicial or irrelevant
information. In a system where juries are unknown but where judges are
assumed, as elsewhere, to be fair and impartial, there is theoretically less need
to filter the evidence since a judge is less likely to be prejudiced and more likely
to give the evidence the weight it deserves. It is also probably true that, as more
than one participant observed, we have overly complicated questions of
admissibility to the point where there is little internal coherence to our theory that
juries are competent on some matters (often including complicated questions
such as with expert witnesses) and not so competent on others (such as
character evidence). Nonetheless, even in a system where the judge, assessors
or rapporteurs are the final decision-makers, there is a need for uniformity of
practice on the admissibility of evidence. There have been a few initiatives
toward codifications of evidence rules in Latin America that are, as yet,
incipient.87
Equally clear is the need for more comprehensive rules of discovery.
There are precious few discovery devices available to attorneys in either the
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pretrial or trial phases. Copies of the complaint and statement of the defendant
are commonly available but there is normally no provision for access to scientific
evidence, statements of witnesses, interrogatories, depositions, and the like.88
One concern, of course, would be that new rules of discovery could be used to
impede and delay the trial process, much as occurs in the United States when
the discovery process is abused. Another concern is that any inequality between
the parties could be exploited during discovery, disadvantaging the party with
fewer resources.
Conclusion
If one can generalize in this evolving situation, it seems clear that the
transition will have effects well beyond the orality, the reduced role of the judge,
and the increased role of the lawyers as architects of the cases presented.
When lawyers can take a much more aggressive role on behalf of their clients,
even if cases do not come to trial more quickly,89 the trials themselves take place
much more quickly and therefore are more focused on the key points.90 When
witnesses are actually called and examinations conducted, the trial becomes
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more transparent than it was when the review of affidavits was the key judicial
function.
Quite clearly, the greatest variable in assessing the potential for success
of the changeover to the party system is the political climate in each country. As
elsewhere, the passing of a new procedure code or even new rules of evidence
and discovery does little to achieve real reform in dysfunctional or corrupt legal
systems. From the apex of government structure to the lowest level of political
and legal organization, the political will to change as part of the democratization
process must be manifested in more than just words, if the reform movement is
to be a success.91 The feedback received from the former students informs that
many judges have refused to changeover or that they merely give lip service to
the new models.
Corruption is, of course, another problem that cuts across all procedural
models throughout the world, threatening to undermine any reform project. Given
the widespread perception of the legal system as corrupt and the few resources
expended in most Latin countries on public education, it will be difficult to combat
the public perception of judicial corruption, unfairness, and lack of
independence.92
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heightened visibility through media and technology of the conduct of trials, with
strong disciplinary actions against the corrupt, and with the ability of lawyers to
protest in open court any perceived bias of the bench, there is at least the
potential for reform.
The prospects for a short-term changeover period with rapid
implementation of the new procedures are not good. At issue is not only the
procedural and statutory reform but also a complete overhaul of the culture of the
courtroom and the role of lawyers. Attempting to train present judges and
lawyers will have some usefulness in the transformation but, on the whole, the
best prospects for the legal reform movement lie within the Latin law schools.
The training of the professors and the revision of the curriculum are key
components in assessing the long-term prospects for the transition. If law
professors can be persuaded to teach practice as well as theory and if the course
offerings, both substantively and methodologically, can be modified to reflect the
needs of the practitioner, then the next generation will learn not only the doctrinal
law of the party system, both substantively and procedurally, but also the practice
skills that are needed to implement that system.
As deficient as the U.S. system may be in its application, the North
American model represents probably the best structural framework of the party
system. Even if it weren’t, Latin American countries would be tempted to
emulate the U.S. legal infrastructure and procedures simply because
globalization has made the U.S. a reference point for most legal and economic
initiatives. U.S. government resources spent on legal reform in Latin America are
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well-spent, not only because the result is more American-friendly but also
because the people of the region are well-served. USAID and other international
organizations in which the U.S. plays a major role such as the Organization of
American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank
should consider expanding their efforts help these reforms sift to the base of
each individual Latin country involved in the transition.
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